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1. INTRODUCTION
The European Parliament's1 approval of a directive,2 ten years
in the making, represents a huge step towards improving the cli-
* I appreciate the time and effort comment editor Eric Green devoted to
this piece. I would also like to thank my husband Erik, my sister Jodi, and my
parents Robert and Elaine for listening, supporting, and believing long before
this piece was ever written.
' The European Parliament, located in Strasbourg, is a governmental body
of the European Community ("EC") created by the founding Treaty on Euro-
pean Union. See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb.
7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter Maas-
tricht Treaty]. It is composed of representatives of the member nations
("MEP"s) who are elected to five-year terms. Although it has recently taken
on a greater legislative role, the European Parliament is primarily a consulta-
tive and supervisory body. It has the power to refuse assent to agreements and
protocols, which is, in effect, a veto power. The European Commission is ac-
countable to the Parliament who can censure and require Commissioners' res-
ignations. The Parliament also monitors the activities of other European Un-
ion ("EU") institutions through committees of inquiry and is empowered to
conduct inquiries into complaints or petitions and bring proceedings before the
Court of Justice. The Treaty Establishing the European Community defined
the Parliament as a consultative body whose views should be taken into con-
sideration regarding issues of common foreign and security policy in addition
to activities generally concerning Justice and Home Affairs. See PAUL CRAIG
& GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 57-65
(1995). For a discussion of the power of the Parliament in EU decision mak-
ing, see infra Section 3.2, noting that Parliamentary amendments can only be
overruled by a unanimous vote of the European Council.
2 A directive is a type of EC legislation that can be aimed at one or more
specific member states and is "binding as to the end to be achieved while leav-
ing choice of form and method open to the Member States." CRAIG & DE
BURCA, supra note 1, at 99. It is distinguishable from a regulation which is
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mate for the biotechnology industry in Europe. The Directive on
the Legal Protections of Biotechnologies ("the Directive")3 re-
writes European patent law in an effort to attract and retain the
profitable business of biotechnological innovation.4 However,
moral concern about the innovation at the edge of this field, in-
cluding human and animal cloning5 and transgenic experimenta-
tion,6 threatens to undermine the effort to be at the forefront of a
new field. The Directive, reflecting these ethical reservations,
contains strict limitations on patentable subject matter and an ex-
plicit prohibition against human cloning. The inclusion of such
binding on all member nations and provides specific means to the stated end.
In this way, directives are more flexible and more accommodating to national
law, making them a "particularly useful device when the aim is to harmonize
the laws within a certain area, rather than produce strict uniformity." Idt at
100.
' See Council Directive 98/44 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 18-21 [hereinafter Biotech Directive].
I See id art. 1 (stating its goal to "maintain and encourage investment in
the field of biotechnology").
- A whole animal was cloned from an adult donor cell for the first time in
February 1997 when Dr. Ian Wilmut revealed his cloned sheep. Scientists have
known for some time that, theoretically, cloning could be achieved by placing
the nucleus of a cell from the animal to be copied in an egg whose nucleus has
been removed. See What Do You Get If You Cross... ?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15,
1987, at 67-68. Wilmut solved a long-standing problem with this theory by
recognizing that the donor cell must be in the same phase of the cell cycle as
the egg. By starving the donor cell, Wilmut stopped cell division and assured
that tie donor cell and egg were in the same phase and could be fused. After
fusion, he placed this "zygote" in a surrogate mother to mature. See Estelle J.
Tsevdos et al., Law and Nature Collide, NAT'L LJ., June 16, 1997, at C1. For a
more thorough and scientific discussion of the cloning process, see I. Wilmut et
al., Viable Offspring Derived From Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385
NATURE 810 (1997).
6 Transgenesis is defined as the introduction of foreign genetic material
into embryos at early stages of development. This process has been very useful
in agriculture to improve livestock and create "tastier steak" and "softer
sweater[s]." What Do You Get If You Cross... ?, supra note 5, at 67. It has also
been used to introduce the genes from one species to another to create chime-
ras, or animals composed o a mosaic of cells. Geeps, created in Cambridge,
England in 1983, have the horns of a goat and the coat of a sheep and mating
can yield either a sheep, a goat, or a hybrid. Transgenesis was also used to in-
ject rat-growth hormone into fertilized mouse eggs to create "mighty mice."
The process has enormous potential for medical research as well. Researchers
have injected mice embryos with cancer causing human oncogenes to study the
disease. The technique was used to inject human blood-clotting chemicals into
sheep which then produced milk containing this chemical that was purified
and sold to hemophiliacs. See id. at 67-69.
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limitations directly contradicts the stated purpose of the Directive
to attract biotechnology innovation!
The impetus for this revision of the European Union ("EU")
patent laws was the perceived benefits that the biotechnology in-
dustry could bring to Europe's medical, veterinary, stockbreed-
ing, and agro-food industries! Biotechnological innovation not
only promised huge strides in the understanding of illness and
fighting disease, but also offered the prospect of job creation.9 In
addition, the EU saw that, it had fallen far behind the United
States in the competition for biotechnology dollars and had to act
to create a friendly environment for biotechnological research. 0
With this goal in mind, the EU aggressively pursued a har-
monization of patent policy that would give Europe a competi-
tive advantage in biotechnology innovation. However, while the
EU was willing to reform its economics, it was not willing to sac-
rifice its morals to attract the industry's attention." The result
was a basic contradiction between an economic policy designed to
encourage innovation and a social policy that feared it. This
Comment will explore the evolution in patent law and ethical
z See Biotech Directive, supra note 3, at 1-3, 10.
8 See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the 'Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Biotechnological Inventions', 1996 O.J. (C 295) 11, at S 1.2.2. [hereinafter
Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee].
I See id S 1.3.1.
'0 See id SS 1.3.1.-1.3.2. The Economic and Social Committee specifically
mentioned that competition with the United States is a motivating factor in
patent reform, attributing a "brain drain" to the United States, which had is-
sued 65% of the world's patents for biotechnological research in pharmaceuti-
cals and had 1,300 biotecinology firms. See id. S 1.2.2-1.3.2. When compared
with the European Community's 15% share and 485 firms, it became clear that
the EU had to take steps to remain competitive. See id.; see also Peter Ford,
Wary Europe Enters Biotech Age, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONrroR, June 10, 1998, at 1
(comparing 1996 figures). Ford reports that Europe's 584 biotechnology firms
generated $2.2 billion in sales, whereas in the United States, 1300 fu-rns gener-
ated $7.7 billion in sales. See id.
n Europe's hesitancy is well noted. Biotechnology critic Jeremy Rifkin of
the Foundation for Economic Trends has commented that "the European
Community has a much greater sensibility to these issues." Good Morning
America: Human Animal Mixing (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 3, 1998),
available in LEXIS, News Library, ABCnews File; see also Ford, supra note 10,
at 1 (comparing "different mindsets: hard charging American optimism and
enthusiasm for the fruits of science against a more conservative and skeptical
Europe," and suggesting that Europeans are "more worried about the ethical
implications and the environmental effects of genetically engineered organisms
than their American counterparts").
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thought that has brought the EU to this state of contradiction.
Section two will provide background on the economics of patent
law in an effort to explain why Europe relied on patent reform to
stimulate biotechnological investment. Section three will exam-
ine the flaws of earlier patent laws and the motivation to improve
upon them. It will discuss the importance of harmonization for
the stimulation of investment and employment and how the Di-
rective was debated with these ends in mind. Section four will
address the substantive law on human and animal cloning and
other biotechnology that was included in the Directive. It will
trace the social attitude toward this type of innovation in the EU
and how this moral debate is reflected in the ultimate Directive.
These discussions will include a comparison of the Directive with
U.S. patent law and policy on biotechnological innovation in or-
der to assess how the EU has positioned itself to compete in the
international market. Finally, this Comment concludes that the
EU's contradictory policies may undermine the progress it had
hoped the Directive would bring.
2. TiHE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS
In the words of economist Adam Smith, patents are a way in
which the "'state can recompense [innovators] for hazarding a
dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is af-
terwards to reap the benefit.'"' 2 While Smith did not invent the
idea, 3 he recognized the importance of the patent to safeguarding
intellectual property and the profits that flow from such inquir-
ies. It was precisely this role that the EU hoped patents could
play in attracting biotechnological innovation.
' David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, Patenting Living Matter in the Euro-
pean Community: Detriment of the Draft Directive, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 990,
997 (1993) [hereinafter Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter] (quoting
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTo THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 712 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Clarendon Press 1976)).
13 The first patent is believed to have been awarded in 1474 when the
Council of Venice enacted the first patent statute which offered a 10-year privi-
lege to the inventor of a machine or process that improved or expedited silk-
making. See id. at 996. Black's Law Dictionary defines a patent as a"grant of
some privilege, property, or authority, made by the government or sovereign
of a country to one or more individuals," and more specifically, as a"grant of
right to exclude others from making, using or selling one's invention and in-
cludes right to license others to make, use or sell it." BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIONARY 1125 (6th ed. 1990).
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Patent law corrects a market failure by allowing ownership of
technological information which, in turn, creates the correct in-
centives for the production and consumption of information.
The result is an efficient market for intangible technological in-
formation. 4 Without patent law, the market for technology is
burdened by externalities." Patents allow innovators to internal-
ize the benefits of their investment by excluding benefit to oth-
ers. 6 Therefore, "the incentive to invent ... is fostered by states
14 For a readable and thorough explanation of the economics of patents,
see JOHN W. SCHLCHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES,
West Release No. 6 (Dec. 1998). See also David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent,
International Intellectual Property Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology,
Multinational Conventions and the Exception fr Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 83, 86-87 (1995) [hereinafter Scalise & Nugent, International Intellec-
tual] (noting that without patent protection, firms may guard their innova-
tions, leadiig to inefficient, duplicative research and inhibiting new develop-
ments and applications).
15 See SCHLICHER, supra note 14, at 1-16. Externalities are either external
benefits enjoyed by people who do not pay for them or harms borne by people
who are not compensated. See id. In either case, these benefits and harms dis-
tort the costs and-benefits to producers and lead them to make inefficient deci-
sions. "[T]he economic goal of patents is to induce investment and risk-taking
in producing technological information about new products and processes that,
in the absence of patents, the market would be unlikely to produce or produce
as quickly due to an anticipated externality problem." Id. at 2-61.
Schlicher discusses the theory that, even without patent regulation, people
would reach efficient bargains whereby consumers would agree to pay produc-
ers to develop desirable products. See id. at 1-16. The idea that a sen the con-
straints of legal regulation, people would find the efficient amount of techno-
logical information is known as the Coase Theorem. See 1 THE NEW
PALGRAVE DIcTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 270 (Peter Newman
ed., 1998). Schlicher notes that information, because of its intangible nature, isdifficult to allocate in the bargaining process. See SCHLICIER, supra note 14, at
1-16. First, there is no way to limit its dissemination to the bargaining parties
only, making it likely that some will refrain from the bargaining process in the
hopes of getting a "free ride." Second, the Coase Theorem is contingent upon
the assumption that there are zero transaction costs hindering the bargaing
process; however, allocation of technological information has extremefy hgh
transaction costs. Unaware of what technology is necessary, people will over-
pay for the production of every type of innovation. For example, a person
would have to enter into a bargain for an innovation to cure cancer long before
that person knew whether he or she would need this technology personally. It
is too costly for all potential beneficiaries to strike a bargain with all potential
suppliers. For these reasons, pre-production agreements are impractical, and
producers are forced to rely on legal structures to ensure a return on their in-
vestment. See id. at 2-5 to 2-7.
16 "'One characteristic of technology is that it is difficult for the innovator
to prevent others from using his innovation without his consent.'"
SCHLICHER, supra note 14, at 2-5 (quoting W.F. Baxter, Issues in Science and
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that grant innovators of new and useful products or processes the
right to exclude others from using the new technologies.""7 Be-
cause patents secure a return on investment, they encourage tech-
nological innovation. In turn, they stimulate the economy and
are extremely important to the economic welfare of a nation.18
Patents stimulate technological investment by creating secu-
rity, the key to instilling incentive to innovate. An efficient, pre-
dictable patent system attracts businesses in search of guarantees
that they will benefit from their research and development in-
vestments.19 Full commercial value can only be realized when in-
ventions are not only patentable, but when the patents are en-
forceable with predictable reliability." Such predictable
Technology, in ANTITRUST LAW AND TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION 83
(National Academy of Sciences 1985)). Patents prevent others from using the
invention and assure that all the profits from innovation flow to the investor.
For this right of exclusion, one must apply to the relevant regulatory body and
comply with specified requirements that usually include documentation of an
inventive step and industrial application. See id. at 1-45 to 1-46. A written de-
scri ption of the innovation and often a physical sample must also be included
withthe application. Once approved, an applicant has a monopoly on the use
and licensing of the invention for a statutorily determined length of time. For
this period of time, the inventor reaps all the financial benefits of his discovery
and collects licensing fees when he grants permission for the use of his work.
The written and physical submissions then become public information, allow-
ing others to expan upon the initial invention. See Scalise & Nugent, Interna-
tional Intellectual, supra note 14, at 86-88.
17 Scalise & Nugent, International Intellectual, supra note 14, at 86.
s The importance of technology to industrial growth has been empirically
supported. One such empirical analysis found that technology alone ac-
counted for 50% of the growth in industrial output in the United States from
1948 to 1985. See Michael J. Boskin & Lawrence J. Lau, Capital, Technology,
and Economic Growth, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 17
(Rosenberg et al. eds., 1992) (measuring the effect of technical progress and
capital growth on industrial output).
19 See The Harm of Patents, ECONOMIST, Aug. 22, 1992, at 17 (discussing
the American patent system, but recognizing that "[c]onfusion, and the litiga-
tion that inevitably accompanies it, are threatening to suffocate innovation").
Unclear regulations and unpredictable judicial decision-making undermines the
certainty required to encourage research and development expenditure.
20 See Tsevdos, supra note 5, at C1. For instance, scientific methodology is
patentable; however, a claim for method infringement is difficult to enforce. It
may be difficult for the regulator, and even the inventor himself, to detect an
infringement on a method patent by inspecting the final product. In addition,
enforceability depends upon the care with which the patent itself is drafted.
See id. (noting that any patent on Dolly, the cloned sheep, should be carefully
worded to include her offspring in order to protect the fruits of the inventor's
labors. If so drafted, a simple DNA test could prove infringement allowing the
patent to be readily enforceable); see also Ford, supra note 10, at 1 (quoting
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protection creates incentive for experimentation and spurs the
advancement of science. It encourages rapid innovation through
a winner-take-all mentality that handsomely rewards the first in-
novator and denies all benefits to the second-place finisher. In
addition, the disclosure of information prevents the duplication
of research and thus frees resources for new endeavors.2 Disclo-
sure also allows newcomers to build on the knowledge of their
predecessors.
The protection of a predictable patent system is of particular
importance to the biotechnology industry where success requires
massive investment. "[T]he development costs are high with long
lead times before significant commercial returns are achieved."'
"It is estimated that 90 percent of biotech companies will have
drugs that fail or are delayed," incurring research costs for proj-
ects that may never produce a profit.' Without the opportunity
to recoup the sizable research and development costs, many
would be deterred from biotechnological experimentation. 
4
Therefore, life science firms find that "patent protection is essen-
Brian Yorke, head of corporate intellectual property for the Swiss pharmaceu-
tical giant Novartis, describing the need for patent legislation to protect bio-
tech inventions as "essential to give the stability and assurance we need to de-
velop our biotech business").
21 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 997.
2' Liz McRobb, Patents Row Over Genetics Breakthrough, SCOTSMAN, Mar.
12, 1997, at 26; see also Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note
12, at 997; The Harm 9fPatents, supra note 19, at 17 ("[-lard as they may try,
patent offices cannot be certain of what is truly new and 'non-obvious'- par-
ticularly in fast-moving fields like electronics and biotechnology."). The article
recognizes biotechnololy patents as an area where uncertainty can raise legal
costs and confusion andultimately create a disincentive to innovation. See also
Amy E. Carroll, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court ofAp-
peals for the Federal Circuit Comment: Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnol-
ogy and the Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 2433, 2476-77
(iecognizing that it takes a quarter of a billion dollars and four to seven years
to bring a biotechnology-based pharmaceutical product to market).
' Lisa Buckingham, Shockfor Shares as Treatments Fail to Yield Hoped-For
Dividends, GUARDIAN (Londofi), Apr. 28, 1998, at 3.
24 See, e.g., Biotechnological Patent Protection Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R.
1417 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Admin. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1991) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (justifying increased patent protection with the fact that bio-
technology firms spend almost half their revenues on research and develop-
ment); Greens v. Genes, ECONOMIST, July 19, 1997, at 18 ("[W]ithout proper
patent protection, biotech firms are unlikely to spend the huge sums needed..
. as European firms have shown.").
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tial if they are to risk financial resources and years of research and
development bringing new and useful products to market."'
3. THE EVOLUTION OF PATENT PROTECTION: EUROPE'S
SEARCH FOR THE OPTIMAL REGIME
The efficiencies of harmonized patent law 6 have been interna-
tionally recognized for over a century.' Europe, while involved
in international harmonization efforts, saw the advantage of a
uniform system for the European Community and harmonized
the patent application process. This Section will examine the uni-
formity that the European Patent Commission ("EPC") created.
More importantly, it will examine the weaknesses of this system
that spurred the drafting of the Directive. The harmonization
achieved by the Directive's revision of patent law and its implica-
tions for the biotechnology industry will also be examined.
s Jeremy Rifkin, Beware the Bio-Century, GUARDIAN, Oct. 28, 1998, at 4.
26 For a discussion of the benefits of harmonization, seeinfra Section 3.3.
' See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 996-98.
Efforts to harmonize world patent treatment date back to The Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883. See Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [here-
inafter Industrial Property Convention]. This Convention required nations to
afford foreigners the same protections that it granted its own citizens. How-
ever, it did not require nations to provide any protections for its own citizens
at all. The Convention also lacked any provision for settling disputes. See
Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual
Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 769, 778-79 (discussing early international cooperation in intellectual
property protection); Industrial Property Convention,supra. The World Intel-
lectual Property Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations, was
responsible for administering the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the Paris
Convention among other intellectual property agreements. See Hicks & Hol-
bein, supra, at 781. In 1993, when the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), The Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") was
created and it is regarded as "the most significant advance in the international
protection of intellectual property since... the late 19th century." Id. at 783.
Unlike its predecessors, TRIPS provided for a Dispute Settlement Body that
can protect and enforce with teeth. See id. However, while TRIPS does pro-
vide "detailed minimum standards of intellectual property protection," the sig-
natory nations preserved significant autonomy over their own patent systems
to allow for the considerable regional disharmony that motivated the EU to
draft the Directive. Id. at 784. For instance, TRIPs allows, but does not re-
quire, member nations to limit patentability to"protect public order or moral-
ity, serious prejudice to the environment, and human, animal, or plant life."
Id. at 787. Despite efforts to strengthen international regulation of intellectual
property rights, significant differences between national laws persist.
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3.1. The European Patent Commission: Imperfect Protection
The European Community's effort to create uniform patent
policy commenced in 1973 when eleven nations adopted the
Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive
Law on Patents for Invention and the International Convention
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants.28 The resulting
EPC29 had, as its founding principle, a provision allowing appli-
cants to be awarded patent rights in more than one country with
a centralized registration system." One application resulted in a
granting of a bundle of national patents. It was designed to be
cost-effective and time-efficient.31
3.1.1. Uniform Patent Application and Review Process
The EPC contained a uniform application process for grant-
ing patents in the member states. An application had to be filed
in one of the European Patent Offices ("EPO") in Munich, Ber-
lin, or the Hague, in English, French, or German.32 All applica-
tions included a request for a patent, a description of the inven-
tion, one or more claims, any drawings referred to in the
description or claims, and an abstract.33
' See Convention on the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law
on Patents for Invention, Nov. 27, 1963, Europ. T.S. No. 47; International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33
U.S.T. 2703.
29 This was signed into existence in Munich as the Convention on the
Grant of European Patents on October 5, 1973, with the intention of
"strengthen[in&] co-operation between the States of Europe in respect of the
protection of inventions." Convention on the Grant of European Patents,
Oct. 5, 1973, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 985, preamble [hereinafter EPC]. Current members
of the EPC include nations that are not EU members. Member nations are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liech-
tenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, and the United Kingdom. See generally GERALD PATERSON, A
CONCISE GUIDE TO EUROPEAN PATENTS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1995).
3o The preamble of the EPC declares as its purpose the establishment of a
single procedure for the grant of patents. See EPC, supra note 29, preamble.
Under this common procedure, a "European Patent" is granted by the Euro-
pean Patent Office under the supervision of the Administrative Council. See
ia arts. 2 & 4.
31 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1013.
32 See EPC, supra note 29, arts. 14(2) & 75(1)(b).
33 See id art. 78(1).
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All complete applications underwent an extensive and uni-
form review process after which the EPO rendered a decision on
patentability. The Receiving Section of the EPO accepted appli-
cations and examined both filing and application requirements.34
Article 96 and Rule 51 of the EPC governed the substantive
analysis of the patentability of the invention carried out by the
Examination Division." The Legal Division was then responsible
for entering the decision into the Register of European Patents
from which the applicant was guaranteed an appeal as of right. 6
The Boards of Appeal acted as courts, interpreting the EPC on a
case by case basis.' While they usually followed precedent, they
were not bound to do so? After a written examination and an
optional oral proceeding,39 the Boards issued decisions that were
final.4"
Under EPC law, the contents of an application became public
within eighteen months of the filing.4' Often, a final decision was
not reached within this time frame, and thus the applicant ran the
risk of publication before patent protection was approved.42 If
the patent request was denied after publication, the inventor's
work was left unprotected and open to public scrutiny.43 This
possibility was not the only potential pitfall for an applicant as
others could file in opposition to the patent within nine months
of a grant.' The Opposition Division heard opposition claims on
the basis that: (a) the subject matter of the European patent was
not patentable within the terms of EPO Articles 52 to 57; (b) the
3 See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 3.
3 See id. at 12; see also EPC, supra note 29, art. 96 & rule 51.
36 See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 3.
37 See id. at 4.
" See id. at 4-5 (discussing the organization and powers of the Boards of
Appeal); see also EPC, supra note 29, art. 106 (granting appeal as of right).
31 See PATERSON, sup-a note 29, at 44 (outlining the stages of the appeal
procedure). For a detailed description of the procedural rules of the Boards of
Appeal, see The Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal, OJ. EPO, 1989,
at 361. EPC articles 110 and 111 cover the substantive review and article 116
provides instruction for requesting an oral hearing. See EPC, supra note 29,
arts. 110-11, 116.
40 See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 4.
"' See EPC, supra note 29, art. 93. This will apply unless the applicant re-
quests earlier publication. See id.
42 See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 2-3.
43 See id.
4 See id at 3.
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European patent did not disclose the invention in a manner suffi-
ciently clear and complete for it to be executed by a person skilled
in the art; or (c) the subject-matter of the European patent ex-
tended beyond the content of the application as filed.4" If not re-
voked on opposition review, the right to the granted patent law-
fully and exclusively belonged to the inventor or the successor in
title for twenty years.46
The centralized EPC not only followed a uniform procedure
but applied a uniform standard when evaluating a patent applica-
tion. They would grant patent protection to "any invention
which is susceptible of industrial application, which are [sic] new
and which involve [sic] an inventive step."4' The EPC allowed
for two exceptions for those inventions that were "contrary to
'ordre public'" and were "plant or animal varieties or... biologi-
cal processes for the production of plants 
or animals."48
3.1.2. EPC Weaknesses: The Coexistence of Inconsistent Laws
The weakness of this centralized registration system was that
it coexisted with national patent law.49 The EPC granted a patent
that was theoretically valid in all member nations; however, the
interpretation and enforcement of the patents were reserved for
the laws of the individual member nations. The members were
not bound by the EPC or the decisions of the Boards of Appeal
and reserved the power to reject patents that were contrary to na-
tional law." When discussing patent law reformation, the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee of the EU specifically cited the di-
verging national intellectual property laws as an obstacle to
internal market development. In their words, the EU was
"s See EPC, supra note 29, art. 100 (citing grounds for opposition).
46 See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 3, 21.
47 Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1013.
48 EPC, supra note 29, art. 53.
49 See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 1; see also EPC, supra note 29, art. 74
(requiring that the European patent application be subject to the laws applica-
ble in each state regarding national patent applications).
50 See PATERSON, supra note 29, at 6-7.
51 See Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 8, at S
1.1.1.
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"over-compartmentalized," resulting in legal uncertainty and,
consequentially, additional costs for businesses.5 2
Considerable difficulties arose as a result of the often conflict-
ing sources of patent law. One illustration was the granting of
the EPC patent for the "Harvard Mouse" in April 1992.5' The
"Harvard Mouse" was a mouse genetically engineered to be sus-
ceptible to cancer for research purposes. Under pressure from
animal rights activists, the European Parliament revoked the pat-
ent in February 1993 and banned further animal patenting until a
formal policy could be researched and enunciated.' In deference
to national law, this revocation was non-binding, resulting in di-
verging laws.5" Some member nations passed regulations specifi-
cally allowing the patenting of living matter, 6 thus confirming
the ineffectiveness of the EPC's harmonization attempt.
Without a consistent EU policy on the protection of innova-
tions involving living matter, the result has been uncertainty and
increased costs that undermine the value of patent law. Innova-
tors remain unsure, not only of the patentability of their findings
52 Id. % 1.1.2., 1.3.2. The Economic and Social Committee's concern
about the lack of harmony in patent law is well recognized. See generally
House Hearings, supra note 24 (discussing the history of international coopera-
tion in intellectual property rights dating back to the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property in 1883). The importance of harmonization
on a regional level has been recognized as well. "The effective and harmonious
protection of intellectual property rights by member nations is a fundamental
element for the implementation of a common market." Hicks &Holbein, su-
pra note 27, at 805. For example, the four member nations of Mercosur- Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay- have expressed concern over radical
aifferences that separate their respective intellectual property regimes. They
are struggling with the "tension between the territorial nature of intellectual
property norms and the implementation of the free circulation of goods and
services within the region." id. at 802. This is the same tension the European
Union was facing when considering harmonization. Similarly, the signatories
of NAFTA confronted regional harmonization. "The NAFTA's entire chap-
ter on intellectual property rights raised the level of international protection of
intellectual property, and thus serves as a model for the harmonization of intel-
lectual property norms within a regional framework." Id at 803.
51 See Tsevdos, supra note 5, at C27.
54 See id.
15 See id. at C1.
5' Specifically, Germany and the U.K. are particularly progressive in the
area of life patents and have both approved them since the mid-70's. Thus, the
revocation of the Harvard Mouse patent had no impact on its enforceability in
these jurisdictions. See American Cyanamid v. Berk Pharm., 1976 R.P.C. 231
(1976) (approving of life patents in the United Kingdom); Baker's Yeast Deci-
sion, 1975 GRUR 430 (BGH 1975) (allowing life patents in Germany).
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but of the enforceability of a patent in the member nations. In
addition, different interpretations of the patent and divergent na-
tional patent laws have led to differences in what constitutes an
infringement. Patentees have been forced to defend their patents
from infringement under differing national regimes. They have
been forced to litigate in multiple jurisdictions to establish the
scope of their patent, each time restructuring their tactics to con-
form with national law."7 The result has been preclusively expen-
sive litigation that erodes or even wipes out the benefits of mo-
nopoly profits.
This inconsistency has also inhibited efficiency. In this era of
technology and economic integration, goods and services must
cross national borders freely to realize the efficiencies of a com-
mon market. However, when each nation has its own individual
patent law, the privileges of patent ownership are territorial."
When protection is jurisdictionally limited, as was the case under
the EPC, so are the benefits of free trade. The return to innova-
tion, and thus the incentive to innovate, would be boosted by in-
tellectual property rights that are "global commodities" with
rights to exclude that are respected throughout the European
Common Market. 9
Conceptually, the EPC was designed to lure the biotechnol-
ogy industry by allowing innovators, with one application, to re-
ceive a patent in all the member states. However, a lack of en-
forcement power that did not allow the EPC to supersede the
national patent law, was fatal to this goal. Uncertainty about the
protection a given nation would afford innovation and the cost of
defending the patent in numerous national courts obliterated the
advantage that the EU hoped to achieve through a standardized
registration system. As individuals, the members of the EU could
57 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1016
(discussing problems arising from a lack of iniformity n patent laws among
member states of the EU).
" See Hicks & Holbein, supa note 27, at 771 (noting an inherent contra-
diction between the free circulation of goods in a common market and the ex-
clusive right of patent, which offers protection within national borders only);
see also Carroll, supra note 22, at 2441 ("Patent rights are independently defined
and granted by individual nations, thereby making protection of these rights
territorial.").
s' See I-licks & Holbein, supra note 27, at 770-71.
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not compete for biotechnology dollars with the likes of the
United States and Japan.'
3.2. The Directive: Improving Safeguards for Investment
The lessons derived from the EPC were that patent law could
only lure industry and stir innovation when uniformity allowed
economies of scale and certainty of protection created inventor
incentives. For the EU, it took ten years to construct a system of
patent laws that could achieve these ends.61 Members of the EU
debated issues of national sovereignty, economic position, and
ethics. The end result, with its critics and supporters, was a giant
step toward harmonization that created the legal certainty re-
quired to draw the biotechnological industry to the EU and end
the competitive disadvantage that separated the EU from the
United States and Japan.
To supersede national law, the EU must adhere to a multi-
layered procedure that guarantees input from all sources but
greatly slows change in the EU. Generally, legislation begins as a
proposal in the Commission that is next submitted to the Council
of Ministers.62 Once the Ministers have adopted a common posi-
tion, they consult the European Parliament.63 The Parliament is
free to: (a) take no action; (b) approve by a simple majority; (c)
reject the common position; or (d) propose amendments and re-
turn the legislation to the Commission."
The Commission must then decide whether to adopt the Par-
liament's amendments or reject them.6' If it chooses the latter
course, the legislation must receive a unanimous vote in the
60 For a statistical analysis of the relative productivity of the U.S., Japa-
nese, and European biotechnology industries, see COOPERS & LYBRAND, EC
COMMENTARIES: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 85, 15.2 (1992).
61 The draft directive was first proposed by Commissioners on Oct. 20,
1988. A final version was published on July 30, 1998. See Biotech Commis-
sion: Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Biotechno-
logical Inventions, 1989 O.J. (C 10) 3 [hereinafter Draft Directive]; Biotech Di-
rective, supra note 3; see also infra pp. 115-16 (providing a timeline from initial
proposal to final publication).
62 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1022.
63 See id at 1022-23.
" See id (discussing the ratification of the Directive entitled "Patentability
of Living Matter" by the EU).
65 See id
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Council, which is nearly impossible to achieve.66 If the amend-
ments are adopted, only a qualified majority vote in the Council
is required.' Finally, the legislation returns to the Parliament for
a second reading and final approval.6"
3.3. Acceptance of the Directive
On October 20, 1988, the European Commissioners proposed
the Directive on the Legal Protections of Biotechnological Inven-
tions6l to supersede the EPC and harmonize European patent law
to protect the biotechnology industry.'0 The proposal mandated
the amendment of member states' national laws to conform with
the universal system established in the Directive. In 1995, the
European Parliament rejected the proposal, sending the Commis-
sioners back to the drawing board for twenty more months.'
On July 16, 1997, after the first reading of the new draft of the
Directive, the Parliament voted for sixty-six amendments.73 On
September 3, 1997, the Commissioners accepted sixty-five of the
sixty-six amendments, 4 and on November 28, 1997, the Council
of Ministers approved the Directive.7" On April 28, 1998, the
European Parliament's plenary session in Strasbourg formally ap-
proved its second reading of the proposed Directive.76 The Direc-
66 See id
67 See id at 1023.
" See Biotechnology: Commission Amends Inventions Proposal, EUR. REP.,
Sept. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File [hereinafter Bio-
technology: Inventions Proposal] (discussing the EU's acceptance of 65 out of 66
proposed amendments to the second draft of the Directive on biotechnology
inventions).
69 See Draft Directive, supra note 61.
70 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 992 (cit-
ing the Draft Directive).
71 See id.
7 See Biotechnology: Council Agrees on Patentability of Human Life Forms,
EuR. REP., Nov. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File
[hereinafter Biotechnology: Human Life Forms].
71 See id.
See Biotechnology: Inventions Proposal, supra note 68.
s See Emma Tucker, EU States Agree Genetic Patenting Law, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 28, 1997, at 2. The Netherlands voted against the Directive
(Belgium and Italy both abstained from voting), but the law was able to achieve
the qualified majority required. See Biotechnology: Human Life Forms, supra
note 72.
76 See Biotechnology: MEPs Give Formal Approvalfor Patenting Inventions,
EUR. REP., May 16, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File.
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tive became effective with its publication on July 30, 1998, and it
ordered Member States to comply with its mandate by July 30,
2000.77
This new Directive is a radical departure, not only because it
requires members to adapt their domestic patent law, but because,
for the first time, the EU has coercive powers to assure that har-
monization becomes a reality. 8 Under Article 1 of the Directive,
the Commission is granted the power to sanction members that
do not appropriately alter their national lawY.7  All members are
required to enforce patent protection for "novelty, inventive ac-
tivity and industrial application."80
"Supporters of the [D]irective argued that big investors in ge-
netic engineering would take their huge research budgets out of
Europe to the United States if the EU failed to harmonize patent
law."' The result is a solid plan for harmonization and many
opinions that the Directive adds legal certainty to patent law and
thus creates the potential to achieve its goal of luring the biotech-
nology industry to the EU. Commissioner Mario Monti praised
the Directive for avoiding non-uniform policy and encouraging
long-term investment in the biotechnology industry.82 The Fo-
rum for Coordination of European Biotechnological Industries
likewise commended the Directive for: (a) aiming for harmoniza-
tion; (b) encouraging invention of new medicines; (c) promoting
research and development investment and employment; (d) ad-
dressing ethical concerns by broadening the role for the EU's ad-
visors on biotechnological ethics and banning human cloning; and
(e) allowing Europe to catch up with Japan and the United
States.83 Clearly, the EU recognized the importance of harmoni-
'7 See Biotech Directive, supra note 3, art. 15, 17, at 20, 21.
78 See id art. 1, at 18.
79 See id.
'o Biotechnology: Human Life Forms, supra note 72; see also Biotech Direc-
tive, supra note 3, art. 3(1), at 18.
" Tucker, supra note 75, at 2.
82 See generally Biotechnology: Human Life Forms, supra note 72 (noting that
there have been various reactions to the ministerial agreement).
3 See Biotechnology: Varied Reactions to Agreement on Protection of Inven-
tions, EUR. REP., Dec. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File.
The Forum is a body representing various European industry groups and is
comprised of the CIAA (food and drink), CEFIC (chemicals), Europabio (bio-
techfiology), ECPA (plant health), EFPIA (pharmaceuticals), and FEDESA
(animal health). See id.
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zation to the enunciated goal of encouraging biotechnological in-
vestment and, with the Directive, the EU attempted to create an
environment which would foster such innovation.
In addition to providing strict guidelines for the enforceability
of patents, the Directive sets out uniform laws to govern the sub-
stance of biotechnological experimentation in the EU.84 The Di-
rective explicitly bans certain types of innovation, such as human
cloning, and limits the patentability of others." While the pur-
pose of the strict harmonization is to create economies of scale
that will attract the lucrative biotechnology industry, the substan-
tive limitations that actually may counteract this effort will be the
subject of the next part of this comment.
4. COUNTERACTING PROGRESS: THE EU's ETHCAL
RESERVATIONS ABOUT BIOTECHNOLOGICAL
INNOVATION HANDICAPS HARMONIZATION
Within the last several years, the biotechnology industry has
made huge innovative strides. An application for a patent for the
world's first successful cloning of a mammal was filed. 6 Cross-
species genetic engineering continued to advance at a rapid pace
with the Japanese creation of mice from adult chromosomes."
Genetically engineered food is flooding into the European Mar-
ket.8 Biopiracy, an exploitation in which developing countries'
resources are appropriated, patented, and sold back to the locals
with a high mark-up, is a growing phenomenon.89
With this rapid change comes an understandable fear of sci-
ence that has gotten ahead of policy controls. This section will
84 See, e.g., Biotech Directive, supra note 3, art. 6, at 18 (denying patents
whose commercial exploitation would be contrary to public order or moral-
ity).
85 See id art. 6(2)(a), at 18; see also id. art. 10, at 19 (limiting the scope of
protection conferred by a patent).
86 See European Parliament Signals Go-Ahead for Corporate Control of Lif?
(visited Dec. 23, 1997) <http://envirolink.org/orgsshag/info/reports/g2.
html> [hereinafter European Parliament].
8? See David Pilling, Cloning Team Scores First with Generations of Mice,
FIN. TIMES (London), July 23, 1998, at 1.
88 See European Parliament, supra note 86.
See id. (providing recent examples of "biopiracy"); see also Carroll, supra
note 22, at 2465 (noting developing countries reject stringent patent laws be-
cause "the patents granted within these countries are granted predominantly toforeigners"); Brian Tokar, Corporate Pirates:UMining Humanity (visited Jan. 23,
1999) <http://gen.free.de:80/gentech/1999/an-Fe/msgOOO61.html>.
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explore the EU's history of reticence towards biotechnological
experimentation from the EPC through the approval of the new
Directive. It will explore the ethical debates that delayed the new
Directive and how compromise was reached. Finally, it will con-
clude by asserting that, despite a concerted effort to harmonize
patent law and improve the business environment for the bio-
technological industry, ethical reservations will force the EU to
continue to lag behind the United States in this field. Conserva-
tive apprehensions about genetic experimentation expressed as
bans and limitations in the Directive might be sufficient to drive
the gains of harmonization away. At the very least, these limita-
tions are counter to the realization enunciated in the preface of
the Directive that "biotechnology and genetic engineering are
playing an increasingly important role in a broad range of indus-
tries and the protection of biotechnological inventions can be
considered of fundamental importance for the Community's in-
dustrial development." '
4.1. The Manifestations ofHistorical Ethical Conservatism in the
EPC
The EPC allowed patents for any inventions that were suscep-
tible to industrial application, that were new, and that involved
an inventive step.9' The agreement carved out sizable exceptions
denying patents for "[m]ethods for treatment of the human or
animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods prac-
tised on the human or animal body."' Inventions contrary to the
"ordre public" or morality were named as exceptions to patent-
ability.9 Plant and animal varieties, and processes that were "es-
o Draft Directive, supra note 61, preamble. This section remained un-
changed in subsequent revisions of the initial proposal. See Biotech Directive,
supra note 3, preamble 1.
91 See EPC, supra note 29, art. 52(1).
2Id. art. 52(4 (denying patents for medical treatments despite commercial
application in order to keep inexpensive medical procedures generally avail-able).
9' Id art. 53(a). "Ordre public," undefined in the EPC, was interpreted
individually in each member state, leading to a great deal of disparity, espe-
cially in the area of life patents. This concept was revisited during the debate
over the Draft Directive in an attempt to unify the interpretation of this doc-
trine. See generally Draft Directive, supra note 61. This doctrine is important
in EU patent law as there is no comparable standard in the United States. It is
discussed more thoroughly infra Section 5.2., in connection with EU/U.S.
competition.
[Vol120:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss2/3
1999] EUROPEAN UNION'S SELF-DEFEATING POLICY 371
sentially biological," were also precluded from patent protec-
tion.9 Although these categorizations appear to offer bright-line
distinctions, the EPC respected national sovereignty by allowing
diverging national interpretations that often made patentability
murky.
4.1.1. Plant and Animal Varieties
The people and politicians of Europe experienced serious res-
ervations and contested the patentability of plant and animal va-
rieties. Historically, the EU had denied patents in this area for
two reasons. First, it was thought that these varieties were mere
biological phenomenon and that the "inventive step" criteria
were not met. 96 Second, pro-farmer social and economic policy
rejected patents on inventions that would allow global food cor-
porations to lock up technology, charge farmers handsomely to
use the latest techniques, and essentially turn Europe's farmers
into contract laborers.' Strong pro-farmer involvement and
popular interest in the debate surrounding biotechnology in the
EU assured that this history was incorporated in the EPC.9'
4.1.2. Human Material
Restrictions on patents for human materials were significantly
less inventor-friendly. Because biotechnological experimentation
with human material is an ethically sensitive area, the EPO hesi-
tated to impose a common code of morals on its members. The
EPC did not mention patents on human material specifically.
However, it appears that the relevant test was the "ordre public"
standard enunciated in Article 53(a).99 This provision gave the
EPO the discretion to deny applications for patents on "inven-
tions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary
to... morality."1" Notably, it empowered the member states to
94 EPC, supra note 29, art. 53(b).
9 See McRobb, supra note 22, at 26 (describing the English interpretation
of "industrial application" that excludes all methods of medical treatment from
patentability).
See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1014 (ex-
cluding existing varieties under EPC's Article 53 exception to patentability).
9z See European Parliament, supra note 86.
98 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1025.
" See EPC, supra note 29, art. 53(a).
100 Id
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refuse to enforce patents that conflicted with their national sense
of morality. This resulted in situations like the Harvard Mouse
patent, discussed previously in Section 3.1.2., where its revocation
as contrary to public policy was not recognized uniformly
throughout the EU. In this way, the EPC's lack of harmony in
patent procedural law affected the substantive law governing bio-
technological experimentation as well. It also resulted in confu-
sion, uncertainty of the patentability of innovation, and high liti-
gation costs. 1'
4.2. Historical Reservations in the Debates and Compromises of
the Draft Directive
The Biotech Directive has clarified some policies, liberalized
others, and, in some instances, become more restrictive in its sub-
stantive biotechnological law." However, the issues debated dur-
ing the several drafts of the Directive are not far removed from
the concerns raised traditionally and those raised within the con-
fines of the EPC.
4.2.1. Narrow Exception Allowed in Plant Patentability
The Directive reflects the hesitancy over plant varieties by
clarifying the EPC and adopting a compromise with vocal inter-
est groups. It expressly excludes plant varieties from patentabil-
ity, but allows innovators to patent all non-biological processes
by which the variety was produced.0 3 The non-biological re-
quirement assures that such inventions pass the innovative step
test. This allows farmers to use the product without a licensing
fee,"c4 but does not allow others to use the patented methodology,
thus guaranteeing a return to the inventing company.
101 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
0 See Biotechnology: Human Life Forms, su a note 72. The specific areas
labeled unpatentable by the Directive are: (1) pant varieties and animal species;
(2) biological procedures for the production o plants or animals; (3) the human
body or the discovery of its elements including the sequence of a gene; and (4)
inventions contrary to public policy or morality. This list formed the basis for
the discussion that follows, which traces the history of each restriction. See id.
1 See Biotech Directive, supra note 3, arts. 34, at 18.
104 There is a question whether the farmers gain anything from the unpat-
entability of animal and plant varieties when the process is patentable. Com-
panies are still granted monopolies for their production process which allows
them to charge inflated prices even without the licensing fee. This is the com-
plaint of an internet posting from Genetic Resources Action International that
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4.2.2. Continuing Social Conscience
The agrarian interests that shaped the EPC were replaced by
concern for other social issues. The Greens, a vocal environ-
mental interest group, objected to proposals of the Directive be-
cause they did not address the issue of the high failure rate on
animal cloning and the repercussions for animal welfare."' The
proposals also failed to address the problem of loss of global bio-
diversity." Finally, activists objected to the dismissal of the
problems of animal cloning with a mere reference to medical, ag-
ricultural, and economic benefits.11
7
Biopiracy, the harvesting of developing areas for inexpensive
genetic materials, induced a fear of the debating parties and played
an important role in the ethical discussions.' Developing areas
often have no patent law in place, enabling foreign nations to
harvest genetic material cheaply and then patent it in their home
nations. Consequently, industrial nations reap tremendous profit
with no reward to the developing nations."n Another concern is
that international patent-harmonization movements will force the
developing nations to afford the same patent rights to foreign and
domestic innovators. This will force the developing nation to
award patent protection to the foreigner,"0 even if the domestic
denounces these articles as allowing the "monopolisation of basic food
sources." Genetic Resources Action International, European Parliament Signals
Go Ahead for Corporate Control of Life, para. 4 (visited Jan. 27, 1999)
<http://gen.free.de /gentec/1997/ul-Aug/msgOO051.html>.
10 See EU/EP/Bioethics-The Debate on Cloning, REUTER TEXTLINE, June
5, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File [hereinafter
EU/EP/Bioethics] (discussing the response of the "Greens," an environmentally
oriented group, to a draft of the Directive). The final Directive allows modifi-cation of an animal's genetic identity where there is a showing of medical bene-
fit to man or animal. See Biotech Directive, supra note 3, art. 6, at 18.
106 See EU/EP/Bioethics, supra note 105.
107 See id.
102 For a complete discussion of the issues ofbiopiracy, see the well-known
work by Alan S. Gutterman, The North-South Debate Regarding the Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89 (1993).
109 "Fraud, deception and bribery are being used to take samples from in-
digenous populations around the world." Tokar, supra note 89 (quoting De-
bra Harry, founder of the Indigenous Peoples' Coalition of Biopiracy). In-
digenous people are never informed about the use made of their genetic
material and are never made a party to the multi-million dollar deals. See id.
110 See Carroll, supra note 22, at 2465 (discussing the effect of developed
patent systems on nations with weak or non-existent patent laws).
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industry has the capability to exploit the technology, affording a
clear advantage to developed nations.'
Several recent incidents validate the concern over biopiracy.
In July of 1998, hundreds of Thai farmers gathered at the U.S.
Embassy in Bangkok to protest the granting of U.S. patents on
"Jasmati" and "Basmati" rice to RiceTech, Inc."2 These varieties
of rice are genetically modified strains that have been grown in
Thailand and India for thousands of years."3 The farmers alleged
biopiracy and urged revocation of the patent."' In another ex-
ample, India alleged that the patent application submitted by the
Roslin Institute of Great Britain for the gene construct of a milk
protein was the gene construct of a rare Indian Vechur cow."'
This cow's milk is desirable because its fat content is much higher
than Europe's variety, making replication of this milk extremely
profitable.16 As these examples indicate, less-developed areas can
lose the profits they gain from their indigenous resources to bi-
opiracy. These incidents, among others, fueled the movement
against the Directive, with a member of Greenpeace denouncing
it as an "open invitation to biopiracy in third-world countries." 117
4.2.3. Conservatism Remains Strong in Human Patentability
The effort to define a clear policy in the Directive has led to a
narrowing of the acceptable patentable material. To create a uni-
form definition for "ordre public," the EU enunciated absolute
prohibitions on patents that may clarify what constitutes pro-
" See id. at 2472 (Even when domestic industries have the ability to pro-
duce certain technical items, foreign patent applicants cannot be discriminated
against.").
112 See UPI Farming Today, UPI, July 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File.
113 See id.
114 See id
11 See India- Rare Cow Gene Being Patented Abroad?, THE HINDU, Aug.
29, 1998 [hereinafter India- Rare Cow]; John Zubrzycki, Horns Locked Over
Plan to Clone Holy Cows, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 6, 1998, at 7.
116 See India- Rare Cow, supra note 115.
117 Bio-Piracy Encouraged by EU Biotechnology Patent Directive (visited Jan.
28, 1999) <http://wrw.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/geneng/1998may12.
html> (offering a Greenpeace press release from the date of the adoption of
the Directive); see also Rifkin, supra note 25 ("Multinational corporations are
already scouting the continents, hoping to locate microbes, plants, animals, and
humans with rare genetic traits that might have future market potential which
they can patent as their new 'inventions.'").
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tected innovation but that severely limit the scope of biotechno-
logical experimentation.
The European Parliament was particularly offended by pat-
ents involving the human body and made this a priority during
early drafting of the Directive.'18 An amended draft, submitted
by the European Commission on October 20, 1992, included a
ban on patenting "'the human body or parts of the human body
per se... [and] processes for modifying the genetic identity of the
human body for a non-therapeutic purpose which is contrary to
the dignity of man.'""'9 This would have the effect not only of
preventing protection for human genetic engineering and human
cloning, it would also outlaw patents on animals cloned with use-
ful human products.20 This was a contentious issue between the
medical community and the animal rights activists for the dura-
tion of debate on the Directive.
4.3. The Culmination of Conservative Trends: The Ban on
Human Cloning
Consistent with the distaste for patents on human material,
Directive drafters and interested spectators were quick to react to
the announcement of the successful cloning of a sheep by Scottish
biotechnology company PPL Therapeutics Plc.' In its resolu-
tion of March 12, 1997, the European Parliament spoke out
against human cloning and on May 5, 1997, the Group of Chris-
tian Democrats (EEP") at the European Parliament submitted an
amendment to the Directive."' The amendment called for a le-
118 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1026.
", Id. (quoting Biotechnology: Debate in Ethical Issues Flares Up Anew, EUR.
ENV'T, Jan. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Eurenv File). One
can certainly imagine disagreement on what constitutes a "non-therapeutic
purpose." See generally Tsevdos, supra note 5 (considering a ban on the patent-
ing of humans and parts of humans).
120 Cloning has been suggested as a method for creating human "spare
parts." See Genetic Resources Action International, supra note 104 (noting that
"[rlesearchers have already inserted human chromosomes into mice, and hu-
man genes into fish, sheep and other animals; kidneys for human use can be
produced in pigs, and human proteins by sheep."). Once successfully altered,
an animal with a human part could be cloned to efficiently create human parts
that could be easily and profitably harvested on demand. See id.
"21 See Gall Appleson, Race Is On to Patent Cloning Techniques, REUTER
BUS. REP., Mar. 2, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reubus File.
122 See EU: EU/Cloning- Ban Called For, REUTER TEXTiNE, May 6,
1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
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gally binding ban on human cloning and a prohibition against
patents for human cloning in all member states which would su-
persede national law. 2
The ensuing debate was an attempt to balance moral condem-
nation with an uneasiness about losing all potential medical bene-
fits and profits associated with this new technique. The EU's
Group of Advisors on the Ethical Implications of Biotechnology
rejected human cloning as ethically unacceptable. 24 They did
not, however, condemn- the technique for animals which could
have "medical, agricultural and economic benefits. " " The more
liberal European Parliament Legal Affairs and Citizen Rights
Committee voted on June 18, 1997 to allow patents on living or-
ganisms including human parts, plants, and animals, although it
expressly disallowed "whole" human clones."6 They were anx-
ious to promote commercially motivated research."2
4.3.1. Codification and Implementation of the Ban
The text of the Directive approved by the European Parlia-
ment on May 12, 1998 expressly bans patents on human clon-
ing.12 Altering the germinal genetic identity of human beings
and techniques involving the use of human embryos are also not
123 See id.
124 See Suzanne Perry, Commission Studying Ban on Human Cloning,
REUTER EuR. COMMUNITY REP., May 30, 1997, available in LEXIS, World
Library, Allwld File.
125 Id.
126 See European Parliament, supra note 86.
17 See id.
128 See Biotech Directive, supra note 3, art. 6(2)(a), at 18. Action was taken
outside the Directive to enact a ban on human cloning as well. The Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Biomedicine ("Oviedo Convention"), a binding le-
al instrument to protect humans from abusive biological or medical discover-
ies, opened a protocol for signature banning human cloning in January, 1998.
See Protocol Banning Human Cloning Open for Signature, EUR. REP., Jan. 10,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File. Nine European Union
countries- Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Por-
tugal, and Sweden- signed the Protocol on January 12, 1998 in Paris. This is
Europe's first legally binding text prohibiting 'any intervention intended to
create a human being who is genetically identical to a being living or dead.'"
Biotechnology: Nine EU Member States Sign Protocol Banning Human Cloning,
EuR. REP., Jan. 17, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File (quot-
ing Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine and Explanatory Report, Apr. 4, 1997, 36 LL.M. 817) [hereinafter
Biotechnology: Oviedo Convention].
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patentable.129 The Directive further limits the biotechnological
industry by precluding patents for the "discovery" of substances
present in nature.' Isolation of a human gene constitutes human
intervention and allows for patentability, however, only if this
invention has an industrial application. This requirement of an
industrial application limits the value of this concession because
the company that invests in the research and development to iso-
late a gene may not be the first to discover an adequate applica-
tion and may lose out to another that is able to monopolize the
gene and all of the innovations stemming from it.
Finally, indicative of its concern for the ethical complexity of
the lines drawn in creating a universal system of patentability, the
Commission agreed to establish an ethical committee headed by
French expert Noelle Lenoir prior to implementing the Direc-
tive."' The committee is charged with the continuing evaluation
of ethical aspects of biotechnological inventions."' Daniel Tar-
schys, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, stressed the
need for examination of ethical issues when he commented, "at a
time when voices are being raised to affirm the acceptability of
the cloning of human beings and even to speed up its achieve-
ment, it is important for Europe to express its solemn determina-
tion to defend human dignity from the excesses of certain scien-
tific applications."134
4.4. The Resulting Interaction of Ethics and Economics Reflects a
Surviving Conservatism
Despite the fact that the Maastricht Treaty 3 ' does not em-
power the Union with competency in ethics,3 the ethical debate
and Europe's tradition of conservatism in biotechnology tri-
umphed over economic concerns in two important ways. First,
the Directive erodes the ability of the biotechnological industry
to profit from research that is now cutting edge, in what the EU's
129 See Biotech Directive, supra note 3, art. 6(2)(b), (c), at 18.
130 See Tucker, supra note 75, at 2.
1 See Biotech Directive, supra note 3, art. 5(3), at 18.
1 See Biotechnology: Inventions Proposal, supra note 68.
133 See id.
134 Biotechnology: Oviedo Convention, supra note 128.
135 See Maastricht Treaty, supra note 1.
136 See Eu: EU/Cloning, REUTER TEXTLRNE, Apr. 30, 1997, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
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Advisory Group on Ethics in Biotechnology has characterized as
an overreaction. 3 ' The Harvard scientists that created an onco-
mouse were motivated by potential profit when they undertook
the experiment to understand the genes responsible for cancer.
Likewise, Alzheimer's and Downs Syndrome may be better un-
derstood by experimentation with and isolation of genetic mate-
rial. The rewards for these efforts must be certain and large in
order to entice biotechnology's research and development dollars.
Cloning, genetic engineering, and the use of human embryos are
the new frontiers in biotechnology, and profits are potentially
enormous both for the inventor and the nation that can offer pro-
tection for investment return.
The second area in which ethical issues have superseded eco-
nomic concerns is the preservation of the "ordre public" doctrine
in the final draft of the Directive. The doctrine has been harmo-
nized by a balancing test and is no longer an area of individual
member state discretion.13 An invention that has a benefit to
man or animal that outweighs the suffering or handicap is deemed
non-offensive to public policy.139 This calls for a case-by-case
analysis that allows a close examination of the ethical considera-
tions of a specific patent application but creates uncertainty that
may deter innovation. The specific enumeration of prohibited
inventions, cloning, manipulations of human genes, and the genes
themselves, may limit biotechnology investment; however, it
provides clear information on which companies may base their
investment decisions. The catch-all "ordre public" clause erodes
the bright-line rule and forces risk-minimizing companies to take
their innovations elsewhere.
137 See id. (concluding after hearings that there are no grounds for assuming
the accomplishment of animal cloning will be transpose to humans and that
this fear does not justify the drastic limitation of human genetic research).
138 The Harvard Mouse case is an example of the doctrine incorporating a
balancing test.
139 See McRobb, supra note 22, at 26 (discussing the use of the balance test
in providing patents for biotechnological inventions); see also Perry, supra note
124 (discussing the acceptance of animal cloning when aims and methods are
ethically justifled and animal suffering is avoide or minimized);European Par-
liament, supra note 86 (criticizing this doctrine for allowing animal suffering if
there is "substantial medical benefit").
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5. CONSEQUENCES OF ETHICAL CHOICES: BIOTECHNOLOGY
FORCED TO OTHER MARKETS
5.1. Liberal Life Patents in the United States
It is likely that biotech companies will take their innovations
to the United States which, historically, has had a more liberal
approach to life patents. U.S. policy has evolved to allow patents
on "anything under the sun that is made by man."'" This stan-
dard has been approved by the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") and upheld in the courts. Innovators invest with the re-
assurance of a broad standard that will guarantee protection for
their investment return.
The United States Code defines the requirements for patent-
ability as "novelty, utility and non-obviousness.""' "Scientific
principles, laws of nature, physical phenomena, abstract ideas and
products of nature [are expressly labeled non-patentable.]"
142
Prior to 1980, living matter was not protected because it was con-
sidered a product of nature and therefore unpatentable" This
changed with the decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, in which
the Court held that genetically altered living matter could be pat-
ented.1" The patent was granted for a bacteria that degraded oil
because that function was not a naturally-occurring characteristic
of the bacteria. 45 The Court relied on legislative history that in-
terpreted "any" novel, useful, non-obvious invention to mean
"anything under the sun that is made by man." " 6 This decision
allowed for great expansion of the biotechnological and genetic
engineering industries in the United States. 47
This expansion was delayed by the PTO's slow acceptance of
the Chakrabarty decision. It was not until April 7, 1987 that the
" Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting the Com-
mittee Reports from the recodification of the patent laws by Congress in 1952).
141 Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 999; see also
35 U.S.C.A. S 101 (West 1998) (listing as the two main requirements for U.S.
patents that they be "new" and "useful").
12 Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 999.
143 See id. at 1003.
" See Diamond, 447 U.S. at 310 ("His discovery is not nature's handi-
work, but his own; accordingly it is a patentable subject.).
4 See id. at 309.
146 Id.
147 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1006.
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PTO issued a formal statement expressing its intent to fully com-
ply with Cbakrabarty.48 The notice stated unequivocally that
"[tihe PTO now considers non-naturally occurring non-human
multi-cellular living organisms, including animals, to be patent-
able subject matter."149
Case law confirms the integration of Chakrabarty into U.S.
patent law. In ExparteAllen, decided in 1987, the patent was de-
nied for obviousness, but the "anything under the sun" test from
Chakrabarty was applied, making this case significant for its
dicta."' 0 Similarly, Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, although
dismissed on procedural grounds, confirmed that the test for pat-
entability would be "whether that subject matter is made by
man." 151
Following the precedent of Chakrabarty, the first patent on a
multi-cellular" living organism was granted for the Harvard
Mouse, a mouse genetically engineered to be susceptible to cancer,
in April of 1988.52 This sent the reassuring message that the PTO
did intend to be bound by the decision of the Court in Chak-
rabarty and would provide protection for innovations involving
multi-cellular living organisms."5 3 With this confirmation, the
U.S. biotechnology industry became an international leader in
biotechnological innovation."
148 See id.
149 1077 OFF. GA2. PAT. OFFICE 24, Apr. 21, 1987.
o See Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (1987) (noting that complex, liv-
ing organisms can be given patent protection).
"' Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 928 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (dismissing A.L.D.F. petition to enjoin the Patent and Trademark Office
from issuing animal patentsj.
152 See U.S. Pat. No. 4,736,866, Apr. 12, 1988.
153 See Scalise & Nugent, Patenting Living Matter, supra note 12, at 1008.
154 Several authors allude to the United States' position in the world bio-
technology market. See, e.g., Biotechnology: Varied Reactions to Agreement on
Protection of Inventions, EUR. REP., Dec. 6, 1997. Since the Harvard Mouse
decision, 85 transgenic animal patents have been issued by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, and about 90 more will soon be issued. See Wil-
liam S. Feiler, 'Birth' of Dolly Raises Patent Issues on Clones, N.Y.LJ., Mar. 9,
1998, at S2. Some examples of such patents include atransgenic mouse model
for Huntington's disease, granted on Dec. 15, 1998, to the University of British
Columbia, and a goat whose milk produces an element of human plasma,
granted on Dec. 1, 1998 to Genzyme Transgenic Corporation. See SciWeb (vis-
ited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.sciweb.com/home/eddyjake/patents/pat-
ents_800_121598.htrnl>.
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The liberal approach to the patenting of multi-cellular, living
organisms has been applied to the patenting of genes. In a 1990
case, a patent was confirmed for a cell line developed from the
spleen of a leukemia patient, thus suggesting that genes harvested
from a special individual and isolated for commercial use would
be patentable."' Likewise, a project known as the Human Ge-
nome Project has sought two patents in the United States for
their efforts to isolate the genes of indigenous populations around
the world."5 6 It is a well-accepted principle in the United States
that the isolation of a gene is patentable; the inventor has created
something that does not exist in that form in nature.' Addition-
ally, placing foreign genes in organisms where they do not natu-
rally occur is patentable.5
5.2. Patentability of Cloning in the United States and the EU
While Congress has banned federal funding of cloning' 9 and
the National Bioethics Advisory Panel has examined the legal and
155 See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)
(holding humans lose ownership interest in their cells when they are removed
so that this extracted material may be patentable when potential commercial
use is shown); see also Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life: Biotechnology, Intellectual
Property, and Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 267, 270-71
(1995) (discussing the controversial patent given for cell line developed from
the spleen).
156 See Hettinger, supra note 155, at 287 n.109. In connection with this
project, the National Institute of Health ("NIH") filed patent applications for
hundreds of human gene fragments isolated in an effort to discover and docu-
ment all the genetic material of a human being. The applications were denied,
not for ethical reasons, but because the applications fai d to specify an applica-
tion for their innovation. See id. at 271. The -utility" prong of the U. . t
entability test was not met. Since withdrawal of NIH's application, more t an
a dozen companies have come forward with possible applications seeking to
commercialize the sequences. See Amy E. Carroll, Not Always the Best Medi-
cine: Biotechnology and the Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV.
2433, 2436, 2437 & n.23 (1995). While this issue is not yet solved, the rejection
of NIH's application on utility grounds, rather than ethical grounds, has left
open the suggestion that such a patent would be acceptable under U.S. law.
157 See Hettinger, supra note 155, at 288; see also Rifkin, supra note 25, at 4
(noting that in the United States "the isolation and classification of a gene's
properties and purposes is sufficient to claim it as an invention").
158 See Hettinger, supra note 155, at 289.
"59 In response to a unanimous recommendation from the National
Bioethics Adiisory Commission, President Clinton proposed a ban on human
cloning. See Steve Sternberg, Human Cloning: Seed Sees A World With Disease.
Free Cildren, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 1998, at IA. Chicago scientist Dr. Richard
Seed's announcement that he would attempt to clone a human being is ex-
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ethical ramifications of cloning and recommended a congressional
ban, U.S. patent law seems to allow for the patentability of clon-
ing." As the Harvard Mouse patent and subsequent patents on
other transgenic mice, asthmatic guinea pigs, and schizophrenic
mice indicate, higher animals can be patented under U.S. law.
161
A patent for the cloned animal itself may be prohibited under the
"product of nature" doctrine, as the clone would exactly resemble
an animal that exists in nature. However, if the inventor added
an extra gene that is not naturally occurring during the cloning
process, this would assure patentability.162
A U.S. patent for the cloning methodology is more certain
than one for the actual cloned product itself. For instance, Ian
Wilmut's method of transferring a nucleus from a donor cell to a
recipient, called somatic cell nuclear transfer technology, meets
the requisite criteria of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. 63
Because cloning cannot take place without this process, infringe-
ment of this claim would be proven by the existence of another
clone."M
pected to prompt Congressional action on the President's proposal. See id In
addition to Congressional action, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
could pursue regulatory action in this area because cloning involving genetic
cell therapies would fall under their jurisdiction, as was acknowledged by for-
mer White House spokesman Michael McCurry. See White House Decries
Cloning Experiment, UPI, Jan. 7, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI
File; White House Regular Briefing, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 7, 1998,
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File.
"6 See Suzanne Perry, EUJoins World Debate on Animal Cloning, REUTER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Feb. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
Reuec File (discussing Clinton's request that the National Bioethics Panel offer
a recommendation on cloning after a 90-day examination period).
161 See, e.g., Tsevdos, supra note 5, at C1.
162 See id.
163 See id.
16 See id; see also Jeffrey Kahn, Gene Research Is Straining the Limits and
Spirit of the Legal System, STAR TRiB. (Minneapolis), July 22, 1998, at 20A
criticizing efforts to patent cloned animals and determining that protection of
the technique itself should be sufficient). This "patent technique" argument is
also being used by the creators of Dolly, Ian Wilmut, and Keith Campbell,
who argue for its application against a team of scientists from the University of
Massachusetts and fiom Advanced Cell Technology who claim to have cloned
cows using a technique not covered by Wilmut and Campbell's patent. Dolly
was created using quiescent cells, which are cells in genetic slumber that do not
divide. The cow cioners claim that they used actively dividing cells. Wilmut
and Campbell assert that the production of cow clones indicates that quiescent
cells must have been present and further assert that the existence of the cows
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In contrast, the EU's broad "ordre public" doctrine makes the
patentability of Ian Wilmut's method and Dolly, the cloned
sheep, questionable. The Scottish biotechnology company PPL
Therapeutics has filed for a patent in Britain.6 ' The application
remains confidential for eighteen months so it is unknown
whether the company was seeking a method or product patent or
both.166 Nonetheless, one overwhelming likelihood is that PPL
Therapeutics will take their technology elsewhere if denied EU
patent protection."
6. CoNCLUSION
The ethical restrictions enumerated in the patent-
harmonization Directive make it clear that the EU intends to be
true to a history of conservatism toward biotechnological innova-
tion. This stubborn adherence assures that the EU will not
achieve a competitive advantage in biotechnological research and
threatens the stated goals of the Directive. The EU has put in
place the mechanisms to entice innovation by harmonizing patent
law, thereby creating the simplification and certainty required for
large biotechnological investments. However, the unequivocal
ban on human cloning and other exclusionary regulations will
counteract progress and deter biotechnological investment.
Commissioner Mario Monti "stressed that a balance had been
struck between the absolute need to take account of ethical fac-
tors designed to protect the human body and the economic im-
peratives linked to the goal of completing the Single Market." 6 '
While the EU may be comfortable with the ethical stand they
have taken against human cloning and transgenic experimenta-
tion, they cannot deny that this move will cost them biotechno-
suggests patent infringement. See Philip Cohen, Who Owns the Clones?, NEW
SCIENTIST, Sept. 19, 1998, at 4.
165 See Appleson, supra note 121.
166 See id.
167 The World Intellectual Property Organization preserves PPL Thera-
peutics' right to file for this patent in the United States first. See id; see also
Sternberg, supra note 159 (remarking on Dr. Richard Seed's comment that he
will take his cloning research to Tijuana if the U.S. government interferes, in-
dicating a willingness to innovate in the most experimentation-friendly re-
gions).
168 Biotechnology: Inventions Proposal, supra note 68.
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logical market share. Until there are world standards, 69 those na-
tions with more ethically relaxed standards will gain a competi-
tive advantage in the industry and reap the benefits of successful
innovation. This paper does not mean to suggest that the EU
should encourage unethical, unexamined science for the sake of
profit. Instead, it must accept that the price of the moral high
ground is in biotechnology dollars that find other markets.
269 On January 15, 1998, the European Parliament, meeting in Strasbourg,
called on the EU member states and the United Nations to convene at an in-
ternational conference aimed at considering the implications of human cloning
and placing a legally-binding, universal ban on human cloning. See Biotechno-
ogy: Parliament Pressesfor International Human Cloning Conference, EUR. REP.,
Jan. 21, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Eurrpt File.
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